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A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL: PROPOSITION 51 AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Damage awards in California have adversely affected
taxpayers, businesses, and government entities.! Damage
awards have such far reaching effect because of subjective
symptoms such as pain and suffering or other variations of
mental distress.2 In 1975, the California Supreme Court rec-
ognized the problems inherent in the then existing system
and began the slow process of tort reform.'
Prior to 1975, California tort law subscribed to the com-
mon law system of "all-or-nothing."4 That is, a plaintiffs
lawsuit was barred if he or she contributed in any measure to
his or her injury;5 on the other hand, if a defendant was liable
to any degree, each defendant was jointly and severally liable
for the entire damage award.6 Because the all-or-nothing
system resulted in injustice and inequity,7 the doctrines that
composed the system, in particular contributory negligence
and joint and several liability, have gradually been elimi-
nated or modified.8
The first significant change to the tort system came in
1. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(c) (West Supp. 1998).
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1998). This section
states that "the deep pocket rule" threatens "financial bankruptcy of local gov-
ernments, other public agencies, private individuals, and business and has re-
sulted in higher prices for goods and services to the public and in higher taxes
to the taxpayer." Id. To remedy this problem the section attempts to contain
non-economic damages. Id.
3. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
4. See, e.g., Id.
5. See Li, 532 P.2d at 1229-30.
6. See DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992).
7. See Li, 532 P.2d at 1230. The all or nothing doctrine resulted in injus-
tice and inequity because it failed "to distribute responsibility in proportion to
fault." Id.
8. See infra Part II.A.1.
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1975, 9 when the California Supreme Court adopted the doc-
trine of "pure" comparative fault.'° By opting for comparative
fault, the court rejected the common law rule doctrine of con-
tributory negligence. There were two related consequences of
this change. First, a negligent plaintiff is no longer barred
from recovery when he or she is at fault. Second, the harsh-
ness of the all-or-nothing system is eliminated for plaintiffs;
however, defendants' hardship remained because they bore
the burden of joint and several liability. The California Su-
preme Court refused to completely reject joint and several li-
ability, but the doctrine was modified." Proposition 51 is the
latest example of the effort to reduce the harshness caused by
joint and several liability.2
Proposition 51 was approved by the California voters in
1986 and affects defendants' liability for damage awards."
Proposition 51 applies in "any action for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death, based on principles of
comparative fault."4 The Proposition treats economic and
non-economic damages 5 differently because it "free[s] defen-
dants' from joint liability for non-economic damages: such
damages are to be allocated to each defendant 'in direct pro-
portion to the defendant's percentage of fault.""' 6 However,
9. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). Until Li, the sys-
tem had not changed since 1957. See generally Id. In 1957, the Legislature ef-
fectively foreclosed "any evolution of the California common law doctrine be-
yond its pre-1957 no contribution state." American Motorcycle Ass'n. v.
Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 907 (Cal. 1978).
10. Comparative fault assess liability among the parties in direct propor-
tion to their amount of negligence. Li, 532 P.2d at 1230.
11. See American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 907-08
(Cal. 1978) (adopting comparative indemnity among tortfeasors).
12. Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, Proposition 51 (codified as CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1431.1-.2 (West Supp. 1998)).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1998).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (a) (West Supp. 1998).
15. Under Civil Code section 1431.2 (b)(1), economic damages are those that
are "objectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of
earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement,
costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss of
business or employment opportunities." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1998). Section 1431.2 (b)(2) defines non-economic damages as "subjec-
tive, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, incon-
venience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companion-
ship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation." Id. §
1431.2(b)(2).
16. See PAUL PEYRAT, CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR-CAL., JOINT &
SEVERAL LIABILITY: CEB PROGRAM HANDBOOK JUNE/JULY, at 4 (1993) (quoting
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defendants remain jointly liable for economic damages. 7
Because a defendant pays only his or her share of non-
economic damages, a defendant's portion of non-economic
damages is not reduced by any pre-trial or post-trial pay-
ments. 8 At the same time, economic damages are reduced if
there is an independent justification because defendants are
jointly liable for economic damages. 9 For example, if the
plaintiff will receive a double recovery, ° the plaintiffs eco-
nomic damages will be reduced in proportion to the amount
they received from the third party source.2 Proposition 51
did not change the "basic concept that a workers' civil dam-
ages are reduced by the amount of benefits paid by the em-
ployer."" Since economic and non-economic damages are
treated differently, the determination of whether set-off
payments, such as settlements and workers' compensation
payments, are completely economic or part economic and part
non-economic has a tremendous impact on the plaintiffs
award and the defendant's obligation.23
While settlement payments clearly contain both an eco-
nomic and a non-economic component, California courts of
appeal have reached opposite conclusions on the issue of
whether workers' compensation payments are economic or
part economic and part non-economic.24 The California Book
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1998)).
17. "An obligation imposed upon several persons ... is presumed to be joint,
and not several, except as provided in § 1431.2,. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431
(West Supp. 1998).
18. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Machonga, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 503 (Ct. App.
1992).
19. See generally CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Witt v. Jackson, 366 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1961) (holding that an em-
ployee could recover damages from a third party only in excess of workers'
compensation benefits). See also, Erreca's v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
156 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that settlement proceeds should be credited
against non-settling defendant's judgment).
21. See, e.g., Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 625 (Ct. App.
1994) (stating that "[w]hen multiple defendants are responsible for the same
compensatory damages, a setoff is not only mandated under section 877(a), but
is required by the fundamental principle that 'a plaintiff may not recover in ex-
cess of the amount of damages which will fully compensate him for his in-
jury.").
22. PAUL PEYRAT, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
WORKERS' DAMAGES PRACTICE (1985 & Supp. 1998).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732
(Ct. App. 1994) (accepting the trial court's determination that workers' compen-
sation was properly reduced from the plaintiffs economic damages); see also
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of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI) 16.75 Use Note25 treats
workers' compensation payments as purely economic and
subtracts those payments from the economic award to pre-
vent a double recovery."6 In contrast, Scalice v. Performance
Cleaning Systems,2 7 treats such payments as part economic
and part non-economic and therefore reduces the economic
damages by the economic-to-non-economic ratio determined
by the factfinder.28 These two methods produce varying re-
sults-sometimes to the extent of hundreds of thousands of
dollars.29 In addition to the Scalice and BAJI method, several
alternative methods have been espoused. ° Paul Peyrat has
offered one such alternative which has not yet been accepted
by a California court.31
This comment examines the appropriate method for re-
ducing damage awards where the plaintiff received workers'
compensation benefits and then sued a third party for com-
pensation for the same injury. The Background section dis-
cusses the evolution of the all-or-nothing system32 and famil-
iarizes the reader with Proposition 51." This section then
looks at the method adopted by the courts to calculate plain-
tiffs' damage awards under Proposition 51 where there is a
settlement reduction. 4 Finally, this section discusses the na-
Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631 (Ct. App.
1995); but see Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct.
App. 1st Dist. 1996) (holding that workers' compensation contains both eco-
nomic and non-economic components and therefore reducing such payments
according to the economic to non-economic ratio).
25. 2 PAUL G. BRECKENRIDGE, JR., CALIFORNIA BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 16.75 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter BAJI 16.75].
26. See also Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
631 (Ct. App. 1995); Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
732 (Ct. App. 1994).
27. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App. 1996).
28. See, e.g., Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct.
App. 1996).
29. See infra Part II.
30. See, e.g., Romero v. Dermendzhayan, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App.
1992), review denied and ordered not to be officially published.
31. Paul Peyrat, Calculating Judgments Under Proposition 51: Effect of
Plaintiffs Fault, Settlements and Workers' Compensation, 15 Civ. Lit. Rep. 88,
99 (1993); see also Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711,
718-20 (Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting Paul Peyrat's method as amicus curiae). See
discussion infra Part II.E.3.
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
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ture of workers' compensation payments35 and the various
methods applied by the courts to reduce a plaintiffs damage
awards under Proposition 51 where the plaintiff received
workers' compensation payments.36 The Problem section of
this comment uses damages from cases to illustrate the di-
vergent results that arise under each.37 The comment then
analyzes the statutory language of Proposition 51.8 It con-
tinues with an analysis of various California appellate courts'
treatment of workers' compensation benefits, and concludes
that workers' compensation is compensating for monetary
losses which are "objectively verifiable."39 Finally, this com-
ment proposes to adopt the BAJI method of calculating dam-
ages under Proposition 51 because workers' compensation
benefits compensate for economic losses.4"
II. BACKGROUND
A. All-or-Nothing: Pre-Proposition 51
Prior to any modifications in the system, the two doc-
trines responsible for the inequities of the all-or-nothing sys-
tem were contributory negligence and joint and several li-
ability.4' Under this system, a plaintiff that shared any fault
was barred from recovery42 because the courts refused to al-
low the law to "aid a wrongdoer."43 At the same time, a de-
fendant who was marginally at fault bore the liability of a
large damage award." For obvious reasons, this system led
to inequity and therefore injustice. 5 In 1975, the California
Supreme Court eliminated the "all-or-nothing doctrine of con-
tributory negligence" and opted for a system of comparative
35. See infra Part II.D.
36. See infra Part II.E.1-3.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part IV.A.
39. See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
40. See infra Part V.
41. See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 142 (Cal. 1992).
42. Id.
43. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 907 (Cal.
1978); see also Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 121 P. 379 (Cal. 1912).
44. See Dafonte, 828 P.2d at 143.
45. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975) (stating
that contributory negligence is inequitable in its operation because it fails to
distribute responsibility in proportion to fault).
1999] 549
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fault.46 Three years later, the California Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that "adoption of comparative negligence
logically compels the abolition of joint and several liability of
concurrent tortfeasors."47
Despite the court's refusal to abolish the joint and sev-
eral doctrine, it nonetheless modified the harshness of the
doctrine.48 The California Supreme Court announced the first
changes to the joint and several liability doctrine in American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court.49 In American Motorcycle,
the court accepted the concept of comparative indemnity be-
tween tortfeasors. ° Prior to this decision, when multiple de-
fendants were liable, they split the damage award regardless
of fault.51 For example, if two defendants, Y and Z, were held
liable to plaintiff A, Y and Z would each pay half of the dam-
age award.52 The court recognized the "obvious lack of sense
and justice" in this common law rule. 3 Therefore, the court
concluded "that the equitable indemnity rule should be modi-
fied to permit a concurrent tortfeasor to obtain partial in-
demnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative
fault basis." 4
After the foregoing changes to the system, the proper
method for computing plaintiffs recovery in a workers' com-
pensation case was to "first subtract from the total award the
proportionate amount attributable to the plaintiffs negli-
gence ... and then to subtract the proportionate amount at-
tributable to the employer's negligence up to the amount of
the workers' compensation benefits paid."55 Under the com-
46. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
47. American Motorcycle Ass'n, 578 P.2d at 906.
48. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1978).
49. 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
50. American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 917-18.
51. Id. at 185 (stating that "liability among multiple tortfeasors may be ap-
portioned on a comparative negligence basis").
52. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 1303, at
225 (1996).
53. American Motorcycle Ass'n, 578 P.2d at 918 (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971)).
54. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 912 (Cal.
1978) (adopting comparative indemnity). In American Motorcycle, the defen-
dant motorcycle company was permitted to sue the plaintiff's parents because
of their possible role in neglecting to exercise their supervisoral power over
their minor child.
55. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 470-71 (Ct. App. 1996)
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parative indemnity doctrine, the trier of fact proportions li-
ability among all of the joint tortfeasors. 6 Since the joint and
several doctrine remained intact, deep pocket defendants
were still liable "for all damages attributable to the em-
ployer's fault which were not covered by workers' compensa-
tion."
57
This modified system still produced injustice and inequi-
table results.58 For example, a deep pocket defendant mar-
ginally responsible for an injury was still liable for the entire
damage award if a co-defendant was insolvent.59 As a result
of certain defendants bearing total responsibility, "[t]he Peo-
ple-taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for
these lawsuits in the form of higher taxes, higher prices and
higher insurance premiums."60 Thus, comparative indemnity
did little to fix the injustices and inequities present in the
system.r"
B. Proposition 51
The modified joint and several doctrine created "cata-
strophic economic consequences for state and local govern-
mental bodies as well as private individuals and busi-
nesses."62  California's solution to these problems was the
passage of Proposition 51, which holds "defendants in tort ac-
tions ... financially liable in closer proportion to their degree
of fault."6 3 Under Proposition 51, actions for "personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death, based upon the princi-
ples of comparative fault," a defendant is joint and severally
liable for the economic damages, but non-economic damages
are allocated in direct proportion to the defendant's liability. 4
In short, the Proposition imposes "strict proportionate liabil-
ity" for non-economic damages.65 The principle effect of the
Proposition is to alter the "preexisting balance among the
(quoting Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979)).
56. See American Motorcycle Ass'n, 578 P.2d at 918.
57. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 143 (Cal. 1992).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(a) (West Supp. 1998).
59. See e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 1303, at
225 (1996).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(b) (West Supp. 1998).
61. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1998).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(c) (West Supp. 1998).
63. Id.
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1998).
65. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1992).
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rights of employee, employer, and third party tortfeasor so
that the employee 'like any other tort victim,' bears the risk
of loss from non-economic damages assessed against a defen-
dant who is insolvent or immune."66
In its simplest form, Proposition 51 requires the judge to
take two steps.67 First, the judge renders "a joint and several
judgment against all defendants for the economic damages
amount found by the trier of fact."68 Second, the judge ren-
ders "a separate several judgment against each liable defen-
dant for that defendant's proportional share of non-economic
damages. " "
This scheme is complicated when the plaintiff is at
fault and/or the plaintiff has received monies either from a
settlement or from workers' compensation. 6 If there is an
independent justification for reducing economic damages,
71those damages must be reduced to avoid a double recovery.
Non-economic damages are not set-off by settlement pay-
ments or workers' compensation because "each defendant is
solely responsible for his or her share of the non-economic
damages. 72 "To do otherwise would, in effect, cause money
paid in settlement to be treated as if it was paid as a joint li-
ability.,
7 3
Since economic damages are reduced by economic pay-
ments, the classification of setoffs as economic or part eco-
nomic and part non-economic is critical.74 Under Civil Code
section 1431.2(b)(1), economic damages are "objectively veri-
fiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of
66. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 711, 716 (Ct.
App. 1996) (quoting DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 146 (Cal. 1992)).
67. The simplest form occurs when there are multiple defendants, the
plaintiff is not at fault, and there are no setoffs such as settlement money or
workers' compensation benefits. PEYRAT, supra note 16.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732
(Ct. App. 1994).
71. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 877 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998) (reduces the
claims against non-settling joint tortfeasors by the amount stipulated in the
settling joint tortfeasor's release); see also Witt v. Jackson, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369,
378 (1961) (stating that since "the injured employee may not be allowed double
recovery, his damages must be reduced by the amount of workmen's compensa-
tion he received").
72. Espinoza v. Machonga, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 498, 504 (Ct. App. 1992).
73. Id.
74. See supra Part II.
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earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair
or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic serv-
ices, loss of employment and loss of business or employment
opportunities." 5 Section 1431.2(b)(2) defines non-economic
damages as "subjective, non-monetary losses including, but
not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffer-
ing, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation."76
Despite these definitions, it is not clear whether workers'
compensation is purely economic or part economic and part
non-economic because it is not a system that easily fits into
common law tort categories.77
C. Proposition 51 and Settlements: The Espinoza method
Espinoza v. Machonga8 set the standard for apportioning
settlement proceeds under Proposition 51." In Espinoza, the
plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye when a glass door shat-
tered. o All parties involved participated in arbitration.8 The
arbitrator concluded that plaintiff Espinoza was 10% at fault
and defendants Machonga and the Housing Authority were
each 45% at fault.82 The Housing Authority settled with Es-
pinoza for $5,000. The arbitrator awarded Espinoza
$6,242.94 for medical expenses, $15,000 for general damages
and costs of the suit.83 However, an appeal ensued when the
parties could not agree on the division of the settlement pro-
ceeds. The appellate court held that pretrial settlements con-
tained both economic and non-economic components and
therefore ought to be divided accordingly.84
The following calculations will illustrate the significant
impact Proposition 51 had in Espinoza. Prior to the passage
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
77. Compare Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
631, 635 (Ct. App. 1995) with Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 711, 716 (Ct. App. 1996).
78. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992).
79. See, e.g., Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 476 (Ct. App.
1996) (noting "Espinoza's allocation of credit for pre-verdict settlements has
been uniformly endorsed").
80. Espinoza v. Machonga, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 498, 499 (Ct. App. 1992).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 498.
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of Proposition 51, Machonga would have been liable for
$14,128.65 compared to $10,900.88 after Proposition 51.85
Pre-Proposition 51
$21,242.94 Total damages (economic and non-
economic)
- 2,124.29 Reduction due to Espinoza's fault: 10% of
21,242.94
$19,128.65 Subtotal
5,000.00 Housing Authority's settlement payment
$14,128.65 Machonga's total damages
However, after Proposition 51, courts must take a more
active role in calculating damages. First, economic and non-
economic damages were separated-total damages were
$21,242.94 of which $6,242.94 or 29.388% were economic
while $15,000 or 70.612% were non-economic.6 The settle-
ment figures must be viewed "in relationship to the ultimate
award, 29.388% of the settlement figure is allocable to eco-
nomic damages."87 Accordingly, the court's calculation was as
follows:
$6,242.94 Total economic damages
- 624.29 Reduction due to Espinoza's fault: 10% of
$6,242.94
- 1,467.77 Reduction of the Housing Authorities set-
tlement: 29.388% of $5,000.
$4,150.88 Machonga's share of the remaining eco-
nomic damages
+6,750.00 Machonga's 45% share of non-economic
damages: 45% of $15,000
$10,900.88 Plaintiffs total damage award.
Proposition 51 in this case made a difference of
$3,217.77.88 The Espinoza court reached the conclusion that
"viewing the undifferentiated figure as a whole" was the ap-
propriate method.8 In coming to this conclusion, the court
85. Id. at 501.
86. See Espinoza v. Machonga, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 498, 501 (Ct. App. 1992).
87. Id. at 504.
88. See id. at 501.
89. Id. at 504.
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rejected alternative approaches, such as an express alloca-
tion, by settling parties of the economic-to-non-economic ratio
because such allocations were unlikely to hold up against
nonsettling defendants.9 ° This same method of calculation
was applied in cases involving setoffs from workers' compen-
sation91 and post verdict settlements. 92
D. Nature of Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation is a statutory scheme to provide
employees benefits "irrespective of fault."93 Workers' com-
pensation involves a quid pro quo: the employer will provide
for employees who are injured on the job; in return, employ-
ees "must treat workers' compensation benefits as their ex-
clusive remedy against the employer and give up any com-
mon law tort claims against their employers."94 This system
is, in effect, a compromise.9"
Workers' compensation statutes have scales with floors
and ceilings to determine benefits for situations such as par-
tial injury, permanent injury or death.96 For example, Labor
Code section 4658 provides for a sliding scale to calculate
payments for a workers' permanent disability.97 The pay-
ment is calculated by taking "the range of percentage of per-
manent disability."9 The employee receives "two-thirds of
the average weekly earnings [allowed] for four weeks for each
[one] percent of disability."99 Furthermore, section 4658(a)
provides a schedule for more severe injuries.00 Under this
section, it is possible for an employee to receive permanent
disability and remain on the job.101
As a result of this unique structure of computing pay-
ments, "identification and labeling of benefits is indeed un-
90. Id. at 503.
91. See Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App.
1996).
92. See Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455 (Ct. App. 1996).
93. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
94. MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES
726 (6th ed. 1996).
95. See Scalice, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
96. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
98. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658(b)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
99. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
100. Id.
101. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4658 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
5551999]
556 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
clear."' ° The "fundamental problem with attempting to cate-
gorize workers' compensation benefits as any particular form
of damages is that such benefits are not damages."' ° In addi-
tion, an employee is not entitled to compensation from a third
party defendant where the employee has received workers'
compensation benefits for the same work related injury."'
However, workers' compensation does not compensate for
pain and suffering or provide for punitive damages.' Thus,
in an appropriate case a third party who was in part respon-
sible for an employee's injury may be liable for an employee's
pain and suffering damages because workers' compensation
does not compensate the injured employee for those dam-
ages.106
Prior to the passage of Proposition 51, the proportionate
amount attributable to the workers' compensation benefits
up to the amount of the employer's negligence was deducted
from plaintiffs damage award.0 7 This changed with the in-
troduction of Proposition 51, but it remains unsettled
whether workers' compensation benefits are economic or part
economic and part non-economic. 8
102. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 475 (Ct. App. 1996) (quot-
ing Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 196 P. 257 (Cal.
1921)).
103. Id.
104. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3850-3863 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998). These sec-
tions "should not be construed to permit the employee a double recovery against
the employer and the third party for the same damage." CALIFORNIA LAW OF
EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 11.24(1)(b) (Warren
Hanna ed., 2nd ed. 1997).
105. See Solari v. Atlas-Universal Service, Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 414 (Ct.
App. 1963) (holding that an employee who suffered a head injury could not re-
ceive workmens' compensation unless the injury affected the employee's ability
to work, but could recover pain and suffering damages related to the head in-
jury from a liable third party); see generally Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Su-
perior Court, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (allowing an action for punitive damages
only in an action at law).
106. See Solari, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (holding that an employee who suffered
a head injury could not receive workmens' compensation unless the injury af-
fected the employee's ability to work, but could recover pain and suffering dam-
ages related to the head injury from a liable third party).
107. See Torres, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-71 (quoting Aceves v. Regal Pale
Brewing Co., 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979)).
108. Compare Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732
(Ct. App. 1994); and Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., Inc., 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 631 (Ct. App. 1995); with Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 711, 720 (Ct. App. 1996).
PROPOSITION 51
E. Proposition 51 and Workers' Compensation
Proposition 51 went into effect in June of 1986 and a "full
decade after [it] became effective, the proper treatment of
workers' compensation benefits under that law is apparently
still an open question." °9 Although the California Supreme
Court in DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.10 recognized the impor-
tance and significance of the appropriate method for deduct-
ing workers' compensation benefits from damage awards, the
court declined to address the issue."'
1. The BAJI 16.75 Use Note Method
The BAJI 16.75 Use Note provides a method for calcu-
lating damages where the employee received workers' com-
pensation and also sued a third party for the same injury." '
It treats workers' compensation benefits as economic and
therefore the proper method for calculating damage awards
is to subtract any such payment from the economic damage
award." To date, only "two cases have touched upon the ap-
propriate allocation of the workers' compensation benefit and
have indicated that a deduction from economic damages
would be appropriate." 4
In both cases, an appellate court affirmed the trial
court's deduction of workers' compensation benefits from eco-
nomic damages without discussion."15  In Poire v. C.L.
Peck/Jones Brothers Construction Corp.,"' the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated that benefits paid under workers'
compensation to a construction worker injured on the job
were properly deducted from the plaintiffs' total economic
damages after deducting the plaintiffs' comparative fault." '
109. FLAHAVAN ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: PERSONAL INJURY, 4:185.20
(Rutter Group 1991).
110. 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992).
111. Id. at 245.
112. See 2 PAUL G. BRECKENRIDGE, JR., CALIFORNIA BOOK OF APPROVED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 16.75 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997).
113. See id.
114. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 720 (Ct.
App. 1996).
115. See Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct.
App. 1994); see also Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 631 (Ct. App. 1995).
116. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631 (Ct. App. 1995).
117. Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 637
(Ct. App. 1995).
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Similarly, in Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment
Co.," ' the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that the
economic damages were "properly reduced" by the benefits
the plaintiff received under the Federal Longshore and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act."9
Since there was no discussion of this issue and since no
alternative was presented or addressed, neither Hernandez
nor Poire are binding.12 ° Therefore, the door was left open for
other courts to agree or disagree with the BAJI method. 2'
2. The Scalice/Espinoza Method
In Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Systems,122 the court
characterized workers' compensation benefits as having both
economic and non-economic attributes and therefore appor-
tioned the benefits in the same manner settlement proceeds
are apportioned. 21 Under this rationale, workers' compensa-
tion benefits are apportioned according to the economic-to-
non-economic ratio that the fact finder determines. 4 Then,
only the economic portion of workers' compensation is sub-
tracted from the economic damages; the defendants' portion
of the non-economic damages remains untouched.'
The Scalice Court concluded that workers' compensation
benefits are both economic and non-economic because they
are a "product of a rough statutory approximation of what the
average injury of a particular type should yield, rather than a
precise computation of actual monetary losses.""26  The
Scalice court pointed to several labor codes to support its ar-
gument that workers' compensation benefits "encompass con-
sideration of intangible, subjective items such as pain, and in
some instances they impose penalties.""27 The Scalice court
argued that Labor Code sections 4453 and 4454128 were not
118. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct. App. 1994).
119. Hernandez, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
120. See Ginns v. Savage, 39 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1964) (stating opinions are not
authority for propositions they do not consider).
121. Id.
122. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App. 1996).
123. See Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App.
1996).
124. Id. at 718-20.
125. Id. at 720.
126. Id. at 717.
127. Id. at 716.
128. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4453, 4454 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
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"equivalent to the tort concept of lost earnings" which is
listed as an economic damage."9 For example, Labor Code
section 4454 specifies that "average weekly earnings within
the limits of section 4453" include overtime, advantages re-
ceived by the employee, but not sums paid by the employer
for special employment expenses or cost of savings plans or
other benefits."13 °
Since Labor Code section 4453 provides "a formula for
calculation of benefits based on some, but not all items of lost
earnings," it is more akin to non-economic damages. 3' To be
sure, "computation of annual earnings for temporary and
permanent disability does not set out a method for deter-
mining actual wages lost to the employee, but consists of a
series of statutory formulas that establish floors and ceilings
for calculations of earnings."132
Additionally, the Scalice court argued that Labor Code
section 4658 provides a scale to calculate compensation for
permanent disability but the employee may still work.'33 Be-
cause "[a]n employee may receive permanent disability even
if he or she is not off work, and may receive benefits while
working at the identical job held prior to the injury[,]
[s]ubjective symptoms such as pain, may be the basis of per-
manent disability payments."
Finally, the Scalice court argued that since several labor
code sections impose penalties for late payments, these pay-
ments are "designed to penalize intentional misconduct of an
employer" 134 and are therefore similar to tort concepts, such
as willful and wanton behavior.'35 Thus, "although not tech-
nically punitive damages, these provisions have little in
common with the items referenced as economic damages in
Proposition 51."1"
The thrust of the Scalice argument is that although the
129. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 717 (Ct.
App. 1996).
130. Id. at 716.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 717.
134. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d
806 (Ct. App. 1995)).
135. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 717 (Ct.
App. 1996).
136. Id. at 718.
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amount an employee receives under workers' compensation is
objectively verifiable, "these benefits are not identical to
compensation for monetary losses, nor are they direct reim-
bursement for ... medical expenses or lost earnings."'37
Hence, such benefits are not wholly economic.'38 Because the
Scalice court characterized workers' compensation payments
as having both an economic and non-economic component, it
viewed such benefits as "the proceeds of a settlement im-
posed by the Legislature for claims arising out of and occur-
ring in the course of employment."139 Thus, the court applied
the Espinoza method 4 ° to reduce the plaintiffs economic
damage award by the percentage of workers' compensation
which was allocated as economic."'
The Scalice court recognized the possibility of a double
recovery under the Scalice/Espinoza method. However, the
court rationalized this potential by reasoning that since
"plaintiffs bear the risk of poor settlements[,] logic and equity
dictate that the benefit of good settlements should also be
theirs."' Furthermore, there is "no rigid rule against over-
compensation."4
Under the Scalice/Espinoza method, economic and non-
economic damage reduction factors are calculated separately.
First, the judge computes the dollar amount of each reduction
and then divides this amount into economic and non-
economic based on the trier of fact's determination of eco-
nomic-to-non-economic damages. The judge then subtracts
the economic workers' compensation dollars from the eco-
nomic damage award.
4 4
3. The Peyrat Method
In addition to the BAJI and Scalice/Espinoza methods,
several other methods of calculation have been suggested.
137. Id. at 717.
138. Id. at 716.
139. Id. at 718.
140. See infra Part II.C.
141. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 716 (Ct.
App. 1996).
142. Id. at 721 (quoting Hoch v. Allied-Signal Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (Ct.
App. 1994)).
143. Id. at n.10.
144. Again, non-economic dollars are not subtracted from the award. See
infra note 16.
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One such alternative offered by Paul Peyrat and the Con-
tinuing Education for the Bar is the "preferred" or "conserva-
tive" method.'45 This method entails a four-step process that,
according to Peyrat, harmonizes the social policies underlying
tort law.'46 Under Peyrat's method, workers' compensation
benefits "should diminish non-economic damages first and
economic damages only if the benefits paid (together with
plaintiffs fault percentage and the amount of settlements)
more than exhausts non-economic damages."'47 The justifica-
tion for this approach is based on the "potential inequity in a
rule which would require an injured plaintiff who may have
sustained considerable medical expenses and other damages
as a result of an accident to bear the full brunt of the
loss .... .14
Peyrat's method harmonizes four policies underlying
comparative fault and indemnity. First, his method maxi-
mizes the amount of money the injured party receives for
his/her injuries to the extent that others caused the inju-
ries. 49 Second, it encourages settlements.' Third, the Pey-
rat method ensures "equitable apportionment of liability
among tortfeasors."'l Finally, in accordance with Proposition
51, the Peyrat method insures a defendant will not pay more
"than his or her percentage share of non-economic dam-
ages.' 52
Peyrat's four-step process 153 requires a trial judge to dothe following:5 4
145. Paul Peyrat, Calculating Judgments Under Proposition 51: Effect of
Plaintiffs Fault, Settlements and Workers' Compensation, 15 Civ. LIT. REP. 88,
90 (1993).
146. Id. at 98.
147. Id. at 97.
148. CAL. CIV. CODE 1431.2 (West Supp. 1998) (quoting Evangelatos v. Supe-
rior Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 634 (1988)).
149. Peyrat, supra note 145, at 91.
150. Peyrat, supra note 145, at 91.
151. Peyrat, supra note 145, at 91 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978)).
152. Peyrat, supra note 145, at 92.
153. Only the first two steps are listed because the other two do not bear any
direct relationship to this comment. Steps three and four address comparative
indemnity. Peyrat, supra note 145, at 99.
154. For the purposes of Peyrat's method the following definitions apply:
"Defendant" is a party defendant to whom the trier of fact has assigned
a fault percentage other than zero.
"Judgment" is the judgment before the addition of costs or interest.
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Step 1: "Render a joint and several judgment for the
plaintiff against all defendants." 5' This is "the amount of the
economic damages finding unless step 1A requires entry of a
lesser amount." 156
Step 1A: Subtract the combined reduction amount from
total damages. 5 ' If the remainder is less than the economic
damages finding, enter this lesser amount as the judgment in
Step 1 and omit Steps 3 and 4.158
Step 2: "[R]ender a separate several judg-
ment ... against each defendant.""' 9 The amount of each
such judgment is that defendant's fault percentage multi-
plied by the non-economic damages amount unless Step 2A
requires entry of a lesser amount.'6'
Step 2A: Subtract the "combined reduction amount from
the amount of the non-economic damages finding. The re-
mainder is the highest dollar amount that can be entered in,
Step 2, as a several judgment against any individual defen-
dant.
,
'
61
Another variation to calculating judgments under Propo-
sition 51 was offered by an appellate court panel in Romero v.
Dermendzhayan.'6' The California Supreme Court, however,
ordered this opinion de-published.'6 3 One commentator noted
that "[a] reader with a masochistic bent might find enjoy-
ment in trying to decipher and understand the thirteen com-
putational steps applied by the trial judge in Romero.... " 4
As evidenced by the forgoing discussion, there is no consen-
sus on the appropriate method for deducting workers' com-
"Total damages" is the sum of the trier of fact's economic damages
finding and non-economic damages finding.
"Combined reduction amount" is the sum of the reductions, if any, for
(a) plaintiffs fault (determined by multiplying plaintiffs fault percent-
age times total damages), (b) prejudgment settlements (dollar amount
or value), and (c) workers' compensation (dollar amount).
Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
155. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
156. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
157. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
158. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
159. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
160. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
161. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
162. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1992), review denied and ordered not to be
officially published.
163. Id.
164. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 95.
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pensation from a damage award.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
If workers' compensation is wholly economic, then the
amount paid to the plaintiff is subtracted from the plaintiffs
economic award;65 however, if workers' compensation is both
economic and non-economic, then only the portion that is
economic is subtracted from the economic damages. 6' An il-
lustration using the numbers in Scalice illustrates the diver-
gent outcomes created by the various methods of calcula-
tion-BAJI, Scalice/Espinoza and Peyrat.
In Scalice, the fact finder concluded that the plaintiff
was not at fault, employer was 30% at fault and the defen-
dant was 70% at fault. The jury awarded $677,000 in dam-
ages, of which $274,000 or 40.473% was economic and
$403,000 or 59.527% was non-economic. The plaintiff re-
ceived $162,008.53 in workers' compensation benefits. Be-
cause of Proposition 51, under both methods non-economic
damages are the same, i.e., the defendant is liable for
$282,100: 70% of $403,000.
Pre-Proposition 51
$677,000.00 Total damages
- 162,008.53 Reduction of workers' compensation bene-
fits
$514,991.47 Plaintiffs total damages
Scalice/Espinoza Method
$274,000.00 Total economic damages
- 65,569.71 Reduction of workers' compensation bene-
fits: 40.473% of $162,008.53
$208,430.29 Total economic damages
+282,100.00 Defendant's 70% of non-economic dam-
ages
$490,530.29 Plaintiffs total damage award
165. See Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct.
App. 1994); see also Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 631 (Ct. App. 1995).
166. See Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App.
1996).
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BAJI Method
$274,000.00 Total economic damages awarded
- 162,008.53 Reduction of workers' compensation bene-
fits
$111,991.47 Total economic damages
+282,100.00 Defendants 70% of non-economic damages
$394,091.47 Plaintiffs total damage award
Peyrat Method
$274,000.00 Step 1: economic damages
+240,991.47 Step 2A: highest amount that can be en-
tered against any one defendant for non-
economic damages
$514,991.47 Plaintiffs total damage award
Under the Peyrat method, Step 1A was not applicable
because subtracting the workers' compensation benefits from
the total damages leaves $514,991.47, which is higher than
the economic damages. Since Step 1A is used only if it is
lower than Step 1, this step was omitted.167 Step 2 was not
applicable because Step 2A requires the "combined reduction
amount" to be deducted from the non-economic damages.168
This number, $240,991.47, represents the highest dollar
amount that can be entered in step 2. Since $282,100-de-
fendant's 70 percent of $403,000-was higher than
$240,991.47, the lower number must be entered. 9
Between the BAJI and Scalice/Espinoza methods there is
a difference of $96,438.82. Peyrat's method, on the other
hand, is identical to the pre-Proposition 51 outcome.
The issue becomes whether workers' compensation bene-
fits are economic or part economic and part non-economic for
the purposes of calculating tort damages. The California Su-
preme Court, in DaFonte v. Upright, Inc.,"' recognized that
this issue is "a matter of some difficulty and importance";'71
however the court has yet to address this issue. Meanwhile,
167. See Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
168. See Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
169. See Peyrat, supra note 140, at 99.
170. 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992).
171. DaFonte v. Upright, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 147 (Cal. 1992).
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appellate and trial courts choose between either the BAJI
Use Note or the Scalice/Espinoza method.172
IV. ANALYSIS
The common factor among all the changes of the tort sys-
tem is a desire to create equity and justice for both the plain-
tiff and defendant.17 The goal of reimbursing the plaintiff for
injuries suffered is the primary concern of the courts,74 but in
attaining this goal, people, businesses or governments cannot
be made liable for all sums incurred in a single action.'75 Be-
cause of these opposing concerns, the tort system has gradu-
ally developed protectors to ensure that plaintiffs will be re-
imbursed for their injuries even if they contributed to the
injury.76 At the same time, defendants will bear other defen-
dants' liability to a minimum degree and even then, just to
ensure the plaintiff is covered for "objectively verifiable
monetary losses."'77 One such protector is Proposition 51.
A. Statutory Language
Section 1431.1 of the California Civil Code states that
"[i]n any action for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death,... the liability of each defendant for non-
economic damages shall be several only and shall not be
joint."'78 The section proceeds to define economic and non-
economic damages.'79 However, "[t]he Act itself says nothing
about how the trial judge should calculate judgments if one
or more . . . 'reduction factors' are present."8 ° For example,
the act does not provide any guidance where the trier of fact
finds that the plaintiff shared in fault."' Similarly there is
no guidance for reducing damages where the plaintiff settled
172. The one notable exception is Romero v. Dermendzhayan, 12 Cal. Rptr.
2d 819 (Ct. App. 1992), review denied and ordered not to be officially published.
173. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1978).
174. See Peyrat, supra note 140 at 91 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (Ct. App. 1978)).
175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1998).
176. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n, 578 P.2d at 917.
177. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1998).
178. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1998).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1998).
180. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 89.
181. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 89.
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with a defendant.182 Finally, Proposition 51 does not direct
parties in calculating plaintiffs damage awards where he or
she received workers' compensation payments for the injury
on which he or she sued.1
83
Since the Proposition is silent with respect to reduction
factors, there must be some other statute or judicial principle
that authorizes such a deduction." For example, California
Code of Civil Procedure section 877 prohibits a plaintiff from
receiving a double recovery. Section 877 provides that:
[w]here a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a
number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort ... it shall have the following effect: (a) It shall not
discharge any other such party from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the
others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dis-
missal or the covenant, or in the amount of the considera-
tion paid for it whichever is greater. 85
To be sure, Proposition 51 did not abrogate the concept of
double recovery.'88 In most settlements, the parties take into
consideration economic and non-economic factors in reaching
the appropriate figure.'87 Unlike settlements, workers' com-
pensation payments are difficult to label as economic or non-
economic because it is not a traditional tort concept.'
B. Interpretation
The California Second and Fourth District Courts of Ap-
peal, accepted the trial court's determination that workers'
compensation was wholly economic without discussion.9
182. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 89.
183. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 89.
184. CAL. CiV. CODE. § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1998) only address proportional-
ity of non-economic damages.
185. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE. § 877 (West 1980 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis
added); see also, Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
631, 634 (Ct. App. 1995).
186. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Machonga, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 499-500 (Ct. App.
1992).
187. See id. (stating that both economic and non-economic factors are consid-
ered by defendants in settlement negotiations).
188. See, e.g., Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct.
App. 1996).
189. See supra Part II.E.1.
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However, since no justification was given for the acceptance
of the BAJI method, the First District Court of Appeal was
not bound by these decisions. 9 ° The First District then inter-
preted workers' compensation statutes as having both eco-
nomic and non-economic attributes and therefore treated
workers' compensation benefits like settlement payments.'91
To illustrate the varied outcomes and flesh-out the proper
method of calculation, the various methods of calculating
damages will be applied to the cases referred to in the back-
ground.'92
In Hernandez, a shipyard employee was injured when he
was involved in a crane accident.9 The jury assigned fault
as follows: employee plaintiff 5%, employer 55%, defendant
Carde 20% and defendant Badger 20%.' Plaintiff was
awarded $850,000 of which $350,000 or 41.176% was eco-
nomic and $500,000 or 58.824% was non-economic.
195
Pre-Proposition 51
$850,000.00 Total damages
- 42,500.00 Reduction of plaintiffs fault: 5% of
$850,000
- 148,943.94 Reduction of workers' compensation bene-
fits
$658,556.06 Total damage award
Peyrat Method
$350,000.00 Step 1A: Total Economic damages
+100,000.00 Step 2A: Several judgment against Carde
+100,000.00 Step 2A: Several judgment against
Badger
$550,000.00 Total damage award
190. See Ginns v. Savage, 393 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1964) (holding that opinions are
not authority for propositions they do not consider).
191. See, e.g., Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct.
App. 1996); see also Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455 (Ct. App.
1996).
192. See supra Part II.
193. Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 736 (Ct.
App. 1994).
194. Id. at 738.
195. Id.
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BAJI Method
$350,000.00
- 17,500.00
- 148,943.94
$183,556.06
+100,000.00
+100,000.00
$383,556.06
Total economic damages before reductions
Reduction of plaintiffs fault: 5% of
$350,000
Reduction of workers' compensation bene-
fits
Total economic damages
Several non-economic judgment against
Carde
Several non-economic judgment against
Badger
Total damage award
Scalice/Espinoza Method
$350,000.00 Total economic damages before reductions
- 61,329.16 Reduction for workers' compensation
benefits: 41.176 percent of $148,943.94
$288,670.84 Total economic damages
+100,000.00 Several judgment against Carde
+100,000.00 Several judgment against Badger
$488,670.84 Total damage award
In Poire, plaintiff employee slipped and fell off a plank
ramp, which ran from the window to the ground.'96 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff and assigned fault as fol-
lows: plaintiff 20%, employer 40%, settling defendants 0%
and non-settling defendants 40%. '97 The plaintiff settled with
two of the three defendants for a total of $45,000 and re-
ceived $82,424.48 in workers' compensation payments. 198 The
jury awarded the plaintiff $285,000 of which $202,000 or
70.877% was economic while $83,000 or 29.123% was non-
economic.'99
196. Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 633
(Ct. App. 1995).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
[Vol. 39
PROPOSITION 51
Pre-Proposition 51 Method
$285,000.00 Total damages
- 57,000.00 Reduction for plaintiffs
$285,000
- 45,000.00 Reduction for settlement
- 82,424.48 Reduction for workers'
payments
$100,575.52 Total damage award
fault: 20% of
compensation
Peyrat Method
$100,575.52 Step 1A: Total economic damages
+ 0.00 Step 2A: Non-economic damages
$100,575.52 Total damage award
BAJI Method
$202,000.00 Total economic damages
- 40,400.00 Reduction for plaintiffs fault: 20% of
$202,000
- 31,894.65 Reduction for settlement: 70.877% of
$45,000
- 82,424.48 Reduction for workers' compensation
$ 47,280.87 Total economic damages
+ 33,200.00 Defendants portion of non-economic dam-
ages
$80,480.87 Total damage award
Scalice/Espinoza Method
$202,000.00 Total economic damages
- 40,400.00 Reduction for plaintiffs fault: 20% of
$202,000
- 31,894.65 Reduction for settlement: 70.877% of
$45,000
- 58,420.00 Reduction for plaintiffs workers' compen-
sation: 10.877% of $82,424.48
$ 71, 285.35 Total economic damages
+ 33,200.00 Defendants' portion of non-economic
damages
$104,485.35 Total damage award
Suppose that an employee was injured while on the job
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and sued a third party. Assume further the jury assigned
fault as follows: the plaintiff 50%, the employer 25% and the
third party 25%. Also assume that the jury awarded
$500,000 of which $350,000 or 70% was economic and
$150,000 or 30% was non-economic. Suppose the employee
received $280,000 in workers compensation benefits. The re-
sults of such a scenario are as follows:
Pre-Proposition 51
$500,000.00 Total damages
- 250,000.00 Reduction for plaintiffs percentage of
fault: 50% of $500,000
- 280,000.00 Reduction for workers' compensation
(-30,000.00) Total Damage award
Peyrat Method
$-30,000.00
+(-380,000.00)
($-410,000.00)
BAJI Method
$350,000.00
- 175,000.00
- 280,000.00
(-105,000.00)
+ 50,000.00
$50,000.00
Step 1A: economic damages
Step 2A: no non-economic damages
Total damage award
Total economic damages
Reduction for plaintiffs percentage
fault: 50% of $350,000
Reduction for workers' compensation
Total economic damages
Defendant's portion of non-econo
damages
Total damage award
nic
Scalice/Espinoza Method
$350,000.00 Total economic damages
- 175,000.00 Reduction for plaintiffs percentage of
fault: 50% of $350,000
- 196,000.00 Reduction for workers' compensation
(-21,000.00) Total economic damages
+ 50,000.00 Defendant's portion of non-economic
damages
$ 50,000.00 Total damage award
As the above numbers illustrate, the usual effect under
the BAJI use note is that the plaintiffs damages are lower.
However, where the plaintiffs fault is higher, the difference
between the BAJI method and Scalice/Espinoza method is
570 [Vol. 39
PROPOSITION 51
lower. This last hypothetical also illustrates the possibility of
the plaintiff recovering money under the BAJI or
Scalice/Espinoza methods even though there is a negative
balance of economic damages. Since only economic damages
are reduced, the defendant is still liable for his or her portion
of non-economic damages. The numbers further illustrate
that the Peyrat method mirrors the pre-Proposition 51 out-
come, with the Hernandez case being the one notable excep-
tion.
1. The BAJI Method
Since Hernandez and Poire each accepted the trial court's
determination that workers' compensation benefits were eco-
nomic without discussion, there is not a great deal of consoli-
dated legal authority to support this conclusion."' However,
this method is supported by the nature of workers' compen-
sation, policies underlying tort law and the purpose of Propo-
sition 51.
Although, "analogies to common law cannot be applied
too closely to [the workers' compensation] scheme, "201 for the
purposes of Proposition 51, such benefits must be classified
as either economic or part economic and part non-economic.
Various labor codes illustrate that the nature of workers'
compensation is to compensate for "objectively verifiable
monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earn-
ings,... loss of employment and loss of business or employ-
ment opportunities."2 "2 To be sure, "it does not require ex-
tended analysis to see that medical, surgical, and hospital
treatment provided as a compensation benefit is the equiva-
lent of medical expenses"2 3 under Proposition 51's definition
of economic damages.2 4
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, "compensable
injuries may be physical, emotional or both, so long as they
are disabling."2 0 Therefore, disability benefits2 6 "are a sub-
200. Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct. App.
1994); Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631 (Ct.
App. 1995).
201. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 474 (Ct. App. 1996) (em-
phasis added) (quoting Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 P. 491 (Cal.
1916)).
202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
203. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4650-4663 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
204. See Torres, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
205. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808, 814 (1992).
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stitute for loss of earnings."2 °7 Factors to determine disability
benefits include the employee's earnings, the nature and ex-
tent of the injury, and the injury's effect on the employee's
ability to hold employment."8 These are the same factors
against which a loss of earnings claim is made in a tort
case. 2 9 Since these factors are objectively verifiable, they are
more akin to economic damages according to Proposition 51's
definition than they are non-economic. Similar analogies can
be made with death benefits.210
In addition to looking much more like economic damages,
the BAJI method supports the underlying tort concerns. The
plaintiff still receives economic damages over what workers'
compensation has paid.21' Similarly, settlements are still en-
couraged because any established rule "can be factored into
any settlement negotiation[ ]."212
Thus, workers' compensation, "strictly limits the amount
recoverable, but does not allow compensation at all for cer-
tain elements of damage which may be asserted in a tort ac-
tion."13 Since the employee receives economic payments for
some, but maybe not all, economic damages and does not re-
ceive non-economic damages, the employee may sue a third
party defendant to recover damages in excess of the workers'
compensation benefits. 14
2. The Scalice/Espinoza Method
The Scalice court argued that although some workers'
compensation benefits resemble economic damages, if you
look closely enough you will find some labor code provision
that may take into account non-economic factors. Therefore,
the Scalice court allocated such benefits along the same lines
as settlement proceeds. 21' To support this conclusion, the
Scalice court argued that since the permanent disability la-
206. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4650-4663 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
207. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 472 (Ct. App. 1996).
208. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4650-4663 (West 1989 & Supp 1998).
209. See supra note 104, §§ 14.01,14.11, 14.12.
210. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4702 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
211. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 147 Cal. Rptr.
262, 264 (1978).
212. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 476 n.10 (Ct. App. 1996).
213. 2 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAw, Work Comp. § 249 (9th ed. 1987).
214. Witt v. Jackson, 366 P.2d 641, 649 (Cal. 1977).
215. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 717 (Ct.
App. 1996).
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bor code provides a scale with "maximum and minimum
amounts payable" and allows employees to continue working
with only a partially permanent disability, the amount the
employee receives may take into account subjective symp-
toms such as pain and suffering."6 However, this provision
makes perfect sense; it fulfills the purpose of the Workers'
Compensations Act, which is to compensate the employee for
his or her "diminished ability to compete in the open labor
market."217 For example, an employee may have lost a finger
on his left hand while at work, but he or she is still able to
operate his or her machine with his or her right hand. At the
same time the workers' ability to compete for better jobs is
diminished because those jobs may require two good hands.
Thus, this provision is not based on pain, but rather work-
place injury. Money received under this provision more
closely resembles economic damages since section 1431.2 spe-
cifically includes loss of employment opportunities.218
This conclusion, unlike the Scalice court's, is consistent
with the California Supreme Court's determination that
workers' compensation did not compensate for pain and suf-
fering.1 9 Workers' compensation payments are "not to make
the employee whole for the loss which he has suffered but to
prevent him and his dependents from becoming public
charges during the period of his disability."20 "Complete pro-
tection is not afforded the employee" under workers' compen-
sation.
21
Similarly, Scalice argued that some labor codes have a
punitive quality because they impose penalties for an em-
ployer's willful failure to pay benefits or unreasonable delay
in payment.222  However, workers' compensation authorizes
payments for work-related injuries, not punitive damages.2
23
Thus, the Scalice court's rationale is flawed because it
216. Id.
217. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808, 814 (1992).
218. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1998).
219. See Jacobsen v. State Indust. Accident Comm'n., 299 P. 66, 68 (Cal.
1931) (holding that there is no compensation for pain unless it raises a pre-
sumption of incapacity to earn).
220. West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 180 P.2d 972, 978 (Cal. 1947).
221. Id. at 979.
222. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4551-4554, 5814 (West Supp. 1998); Scalice v. Per-
formance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 717-18 (Ct. App. 1996).
223. See Ferguson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 806, 811
(Ct. App. 1995).
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tried to analogize workers' compensation benefits too closely
to common law tort damages.224 After several analogies be-
tween workers' compensation benefits and common law tort
damages, the Scalice court concluded that "rather than at-
tempt to fit the different components of workers' compensa-
tion benefits into specified items of out-of-pocket or more
subjective losses," they viewed such payments as they would
view settlement proceeds.225
Clearly, when parties are in settlement negotiations,
non-economic damages are taken into consideration when
calculating appropriate settlement figures. Parties also con-
sider how much money a jury would award both for specific
injuries and for pain and suffering. This subjective thought
process does not occur in calculating workers' compensation
benefits; rather, the parties refer to the appropriate labor
code and calculate the payments accordingly. Therefore, this
process is not subjective.
3. The Peyrat Method
The Peyrat method is desirable because it, arguably, best
harmonizes the policies underlying the tort system. Fur-
thermore, the Peyrat method strictly interprets the language
of Proposition 51 as not expressly authorizing a reduction
from economic damages unless necessary to prevent a double
recovery.226 In this last respect, Peyrat's method "insures
that the total amount of any settlements, plus the dollar
amount of the judgment, will not exceed the total damages
awarded." '227
However, the effect of the Peyrat method, as aforemen-
tioned, would effectively invalidate Proposition 51. As in Es-
pinoza, the plaintiff would have received $514,991.47 under
both pre-Proposition 51 and Peyrat's method. Similarly, in
Poire, both the pre-Proposition 51 and Peyrat method result
in the plaintiff receiving $100,575.52 in total damages. Fur-
thermore, in the last hypothetical, the Peyrat method, like
the pre-Proposition 51 calculation, resulted in the plaintiff
receiving no compensation despite the defendant's 25% li-
224. Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 474-75 (Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 P. 491 (Cal. 1916)).
225. Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Sys., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711, 718 (Ct.
App. 1996).
226. Peyrat, supra note 140, at 89-90.
227. Torres, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.
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ability. Thus, in three of the four cases compared, the Peyrat
method results in the same outcome as pre-Proposition 51.
Furthermore, accepting the Peyrat method would require a
court to call into question all cases that addressed credits, in-
cluding pre-trial settlements.228 Espinoza has been widely ac-
cepted by various courts for computing settlement pay-
ments."' Even the Second District Court of Appeal which
decided Poire and subtracted workers' compensation benefits
from economic damages accepted Espinoza for settlement
proceeds."'
V. PROPOSAL
The California Supreme Court should recognize workers'
compensation payments as wholly economic and therefore
subtract any such payments from a plaintiffs economic dam-
ages. The citizens of California adopted Proposition 51 be-
cause the previous system "threatened financial bankruptcy
of local governments, other public agencies, private individu-
als and businesses, and has resulted in higher prices for
goods and services to the public and in higher taxes to the
taxpayers."2" ' The BAJI Method, as represented in Hernan-
dez and Poire, ensures that the plaintiff receives compensa-
tion for his or her injuries." 2 At the same time, BAJI method
ensures that the plaintiff does not receive a double recovery.
This approach then meets the primary concern of tort law
while meeting the more recent concern of double payments
and overburdening deep-pocket defendants.233
The BAJI Method recognizes the difficulty of classifying
workers' compensation benefits as wholly economic or part
economic and part non-economic, but also recognizes that
this classification must be made in order to calculate pay-
ments under Proposition 51. Since workers' compensation
benefits compensate employees for on the job injuries and not
for pain and suffering or punitive damages, such payments
228. See id.
229. Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631 (Ct.
App. 1995); Greathouse v. Amcord, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1995);
Reagan Roofing Co. v. Super. Ct., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Ct. App. 1994).
230. Poire, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637.
231. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1431.1(a) (West Supp. 1998).
232. See generally Sears Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 147
Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1978).
233. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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are more akin to economic damages."'
The Scalice opinion represents an unjustified shift away
from calculating workers' compensation payments under the
BAJI method to characterizing workers' compensation bene-
fits as proceeds from a settlement."5 This shift is unjustified
because it looks too closely at workers' compensation rather
than looking at the nature of workers' compensation. The na-
ture of workers' compensation is to reimburse an employee
for economic losses he or she has suffered.2"6 Furthermore,
the California Supreme Court held that workers' compensa-
tion does not include pain and suffering2. 7 or punitive dam-
ages.
2 38
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of workers' compensation's unique characteris-
tics, it is not easily categorized into economic or non-economic
damages; however, Proposition 51 requires just such a classi-
fication. Thus, since workers' compensation is objectively
verifiable it is roughly equivalent to economic losses and
should be classified as such for the purposes of Proposition
51.
Workers' compensation compensates for partial injury,
permanent injury or death, but does not compensate for sub-jective symptoms such as pain and suffering.239 Rather, the
systems' sliding scale24° is an efficient way to provide more
money for more severe injuries and less money for less severe
injuries. The system is not perfect and some workers may
receive more money for less severe injuries, but this is an im-
perfection in the workers' compensation system. Such money
should not be termed pain and suffering thereby effecting
classification for the purposes of Proposition 51.
Laura Buhl
234. See supra Part IV.B.1.
235. See supra Part IV.B.1.
236. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
237. See Jacobsen v. State Indust. Accident Comm'n., 299 P. 66, 68 (Cal.
1931) (recognizing that there is no compensation for pain unless it raises a pre-
sumption of incapacity to earn).
238. See Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1980) (allowing an action for punitive damages only in an action at law).
239. Jacobsen v. State Indust. Accident Comm'n., 299 P. 66, 68 (Cal. 1931).
240. See supra note 95.
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